Newly elected PSC members must balance their countries’ interests with continental imperatives for the good of Africa.
Fifteen members were elected to the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) at its recent summit in Addis Ababa. Five will serve for three years, while 10 will be on the Council for two years.
North Africa members are Morocco (three years) and Tunisia. West Africa has Nigeria (three years), The Gambia, Ghana and Senegal. Cameroon (three years), Republic of Congo and Burundi represent Central Africa. East Africa has Djibouti (three years), Uganda and Tanzania. Namibia (three years), South Africa and Zimbabwe were elected for southern Africa.
The summit noted its concern that all five regions of the continent were experiencing turmoil. This includes security and political tensions and violence at intra-and interstate level, terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organised crimes and border disputes. Also mentioned were political governance and democratic transition, sectarian and resource conflicts, secessionist agitations, maritime insecurity and strained diplomatic relations. Recognising these worrying trends means that the AU, particularly the PSC, must be more decisive in deliberations and decisions.The PSC continues to be reactive rather than proactive – stuck in bureaucratic and review processes
At least four main dangers threaten the capacity of the Council to make a positive impact. First, the PSC continues to be largely reactive rather than proactive. It is also bogged down by bureaucratic and review processes. In addition, the Council and regional economic communities (RECs) have not created effective systematic synergies in their governance, peace and security responses. Lastly, the perennial question of funding has not yet been sustainably resolved.
Fierce competition for seats
There was notable competition in these elections, with 22 initial candidates, including seven candidates for three eastern region seats. Central Africa had five candidates for three seats. Candidates on voting day numbered 19. Some seats required several rounds of voting before a candidate was elected. Interest in PSC seats is evident. This reflects a recognition of the Council’s important mandate, which, if used more effectively, can play a crucial role in continental governance, peace and security.
| Region | Number of available seats | Candidates |
| Central | Three | Burundi – Two-year termCameroon – Three-year termChad – Three-year termEquatorial Guinea – Two-year termRepublic of Congo – Two-year term |
| East | Three | Djibouti – Three-year termEritrea – Three-year termEthiopia – Two-year termMauritius – Two-year termSomalia – Three-year termTanzania – Two-year termUganda – Two-year term |
| North | Two | Morocco – Three-year termTunisia – Two-year term |
| West | Four | Burkina Faso – Two-year termThe Gambia – Two-year termGhana – Two-year termNigeria – Three-year termSenegal – Two-year term |
| South | Three | Namibia – Three-year termSouth Africa – Two-year termZambia – Two-year term |
Of the 15 members, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Burundi and Djibouti were re-elected. Nine are new members that have all had a previous stint on the Council, although Senegal and Tunisia are returning after a hiatus of more than 10 years.
The re-election of six candidates is likely to contribute to continuity on the Council, which should help with some of the outstanding dossiers of the past two or three years. Since meeting readouts are not a PSC practice, some members are relied on to carry institutional memory. And Nigeria, which has been on the Council uninterruptedly since 2004, would probably be best placed to carry that memory.
Mixed membership bag
The PSC’s dynamics will be shaped by its composition and influenced by the internal challenges and regimes of members.
| Country | Term | Expiry of mandate | Region |
| Morocco | 3 | 31/03/2025 | Northern Africa |
| Gambia | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Western Africa |
| Burundi* | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Central Africa |
| Cameroon* | 3 | 31/03/2025 | Central Africa |
| Republic of Congo | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Central Africa |
| Djibouti* | 3 | 31/03/2025 | Eastern Africa |
| Tunisia | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Northern Africa |
| Uganda | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Eastern Africa |
| Ghana* | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Western Africa |
| Tanzania | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Western Africa |
| Namibia | 3 | 31/03/2025 | Southern Africa |
| South Africa | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Southern Africa |
| Zimbabwe | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Southern Africa |
| Nigeria* | 3 | 31/03/2025 | Western Africa |
| Senegal* | 2 | 31/03/2024 | Western Africa |
*Re-elected to the PSC
From its new composition, it is not immediately clear how the Council will swing on difficult issues. Will it make strong pronouncements and decisions? It is also uncertain if countries will continue to outmanoeuvre each other to allow tabling of only certain issues or to block other issues, particularly country-specific ones. Perhaps a critical mass of countries will emerge to give new impetus to PSC actions.
The Council is effectively a mixed bag of members that might use their power effectively to address Africa’s governance, peace and security challenges, or seek to retain the status quo. South Africa, for instance, has indicated that it will ensure implementation of the AU’s frameworks and instruments. During his inaugural speech as chair of the AU for 2022, Senegal President Macky Sall mentioned that the continent is facing a ‘peace and security emergency.’
In that sense, both South Africa and Senegal may form the backbone of a critical mass with the commitment and resolve to address the continent’s governance issues. This would be welcome given the PSC’s need to transcend bloc mentality and create synergies across regional groupings to tackle priorities.
The implications of the different governance, peace and security scenarios are essentially two-fold. Should the status quo prevail and the RECs not step up to the plate (not all will), AU responses may continue to have little impact on continental conflicts and crises.A critical mass of countries may emerge to give new impetus to Council actions
On the other hand, a more decisive, consistent and coherent PSC may give the continent a fighting chance. Although the PSC alone cannot resolve all the complex peace and security threats, it can contribute more significantly to finding solutions to insecurity in Africa. It will be greatly pressured to be more proactive and decisive in the next few years.
West Africa, despite violent extremism and recent military coups in Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso, is sending to the Council countries seen as addressing internal governance challenges. The Economic Community of West African States is, in fact, reviewing its protocol on democracy and good governance.
This is expected to lead to amendments to better tackle unconstitutional (civilian and military) changes of government and inadequate governance. Southern and western Africa may, therefore, be less reluctant to place on the agenda contested matters such as Ghana did in 2021 with the Ethiopian situation.The PSC will be called on to be more proactive and decisive in addressing the continent’s challenges
Conversely, the AU and some RECs, including the Southern African Development Community, have not seen eye-to-eye on several occasions. The possibility that some Council members could table contested issues may be offset by differing views or competition between the AU and a REC. Subsidiarity and the claim to sovereignty may also remain obstacles to an active, let alone decisive, PSC.
The Council may be closer to tabling controversial issues or there may be more of the same as seen at the PSC in 2021. The central and northern regions may continue to counterbalance a more decisive and bold Council.
Coups and instability among 2022 hurdles
Despite the above dynamics, the PSC will, in 2022, be called on to be more proactive and decisive in addressing the continent’s governance, peace and security challenges. It will have to contend with the ‘transitions’ in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan. The coups in West Africa (four in the past two years) create the fear of more coups in the region, as evidenced by the attempted coup in Guinea Bissau on 1 February.
The Council will have to continue to deal with instability in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya and Somalia. It will also be expected to address violent extremism across the continent as the need grows to strengthen Africa’s peace, security and governance architectures.