JOHN KIMBUTE
NOT many people realize that Tanzania is standing at a prophetic moment of the eclipse and collapse of the traditional edifice of thought that is generally characterized with founding father Julius Nyerere, repeated over airwaves repeatedly during this election period. A relentless drift of opinion towards voting many opposition MPs and even a reasonable chance of winning the presidency for the leading opposition candidate, conjugal tantrums apart, was also indicative of approaching instability. Chances that an opposition government is formed and rules amicably with state institutions were virtually nil.
This relentless movement towards opposition candidates especially at the top level, bespeaks of clear instability it is likely to have as state institutions are used to an ethic of comprehending what CCM as the ruling party is doing, not when it is jostling for influence with other parties. At the same time there has been a tendency towards anarchy even during the past five years, that when the government was on the defensive on EPA payments and other controversies, purchasing the loyalty of Parliament becomes a problem. State institutions become a burden to the taxpayer as they are paid highly to maintain silence.
What few political observers have noticed is that no proper election debate was taking place, as no contending lines of policy existed, only an attempt to compare ‘policies’ of various parties, which in a way constituted in presenting differently how local problems could be resolved. Not an inkling existed that when a country follows a reform policy one set of implications is likely, and when it follows a non-reform policy, another set of implications follows. When such elementary comprehension of election choices does not exist, it is possible a shock is necessary so that the level of common sense improves.
Faced with the sort of comprehension of what the problem is – namely, lack of a leadership that has the will to solve problems – chances of voters picking the same government were few indeed, as being aware of the ‘value of the vote’ was more or less coincident with voting for opposition. The reason in part is the dominance of Mwalimu’s ideas over popular sentiments, turning liberalization and for that matter globalization into a joke, a laughing matter – in which case policy change is irrelevant, only the political will is needed. At heart though the problem is an economic nationalism strict with prerogatives.
The radicalisation of the political atmosphere over the past two to three years was directly at par with creeping disillusion of fourth phase action with expectations during the 2005 polls. As usual the voters misplaced their sentiments owing to the unofficial constitution of political sentiments that solutions to economic woes should be sought within a socialist frame of doing things, that is, without widening the extent of privatisation. With that kind of limitation, the potential existing for economic growth is what was already achieved in terms of liberalization, and limits placed for instance in penetration of capital.
Back in 2005 voters placed their hopes in a new CCM candidate who for various reasons considered either safe or committed to reversing liberalization, for the simple reason that there is no economics in Tanzania worth the name, and instead there are ‘civil societies.’ How Tanzania succeeded in removing all idea of economic debate isn’t surprising given the popularity of Ujamaa in the 1970s, and many of those who taught courses in ideological classes at all levels are still around, or their fervent pupils have taken the reins to precisely the same effect. Marxism, the revolution, was baptised to ‘human rights.’
The profound trouble that is encroaching upon the country is that picking a radical opposition leader to office means he would wishto legitimize his election by hounding corruption suspects of past years, whereas that is the wrong way of going about it. Fighting corruption requires that one ‘forgives’ the past and supervises his own team against being sold to corruption, which is the harder method. The easier method is to fight past corruption and when it starts spreading in the new regime, and people expect that the leader will be as vehement and as principled as in the previous issues, he mellows and snorts.
Were it that voters had picked a radical reformist leader who first moves to privatize the railway system and garners one trillion shillings for 99 year lease on the dilapidated railway system as a whole, and then moves to Tanesco for nearly the same amount, things would change rapidly. The would be enough to meet the demands of most sectors as least by current estimates to a considerable extent, and with an expanding tax base, employment spiral and large flows of capital equipment, the demand structure of internal economic activity would start changing fast. Those are the ringing bells of fast economic growth.
Thus Tanzania is on record as one country in Africa that has had peace for 49 years and failed to use that peace to engender fast economic growth, and like others it is satisfied with five to six per cent annual growth whereas to start denting poverty seven per cent growth levels are minimal. The hindrance to rapid economic growth is the contempt engendered by Mwalimu’s sharp admonitions against turning towards globalization and relying on the private sector. Like all socialists, he saw in public sector firms the salvation of the people, and in private sector encroachment as a debacle, death of our industries.
This general election is hence the last with Mwalimu’s influence intact as it is with this weapon that voters will be selecting an explosive mixture, of rural MPs with loyalty to CCM rooted in the past, and urban MPs more likely to reflect opposition sentiments. How far state institutions will allow proper vote counting and registration of results to take place will depend on trends noticed on how far CCM would be losing or winning, with urban areas most exposed to chaos or anarchy as its soul or spirit is firmly in opposition hold. State institutions shall look with disapproval all action the new regime may take to alter the neat balances of ‘party-government’ relationships built thus far, so any radical change is unhelpful.
That same opposition regime if it comes about will be enjoined to make even greater mistakes than in the past half decade, as it is even less aware than its predecessor the imperative of economic reform. Were it really to go in the direction of dominant voices among the NGO fraternity, which pushes public sector solutions with good leaders and fair sharing out of the national income, while legislature is being widened and salaries hiked in government, no improvement would come up. Explosion woud then follow arising from unmet expectations as in 2005 – but this time no Nyerenomic solutions would exist, as the political system would come round to know that ‘good leaders’ don’t exist, only workable policies.
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